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Emigration and the Age Profile of Retirement among Immigrants
*
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between immigrants’ retirement status and the 
prevalence of return migration from the host country to their country of origin. We develop a 
simple theoretical model to illustrate that under reasonable conditions the probability of return 
migration is maximized at retirement. Reduced-form models of retirement status which 
control for the rate of return migration are then estimated using unique data on emigration 
rates matched to individual-level data for Australia. We find that immigrants, particularly 
immigrant women, are more likely to be retired than are native-born men and women with the 
same demographic, human capital, and family characteristics. Moreover, within the immigrant 
population, there is a negative relationship between the propensity to be retired and the 
return migration rate of one’s fellow countrymen, particularly amongst men. This link is 
strongest for those individuals who are at (or near) retirement age and among those with the 
highest cost of return migration. These results suggest that the fiscal pressures associated 
with aging immigrant populations vary substantially across origin countries. 
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* This paper uses confidentialised unit record file data from the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services, and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) and is 
managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (MIAESR). The 
findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to FaHCSIA, MIAESR, or Motu.   1
1.  Introduction 
Over  the  past  several  decades,  economists  have  made  great  strides  in  understanding  the 
migration  patterns,  assimilation  processes,  and  economic  impact  of  the  now  nearly  three 
percent of the world’s population living outside their country of birth (see UN 2006).  Most 
of  our  understanding  comes  from  analyses  of  prime  working-age  immigrants  who  are 
assumed  to  remain  permanently  in  their  new  country.    Although  return  migration  occurs 
frequently,  we  know  very  little  about  how  host-country  outcomes  for  temporary  and 
permanent  migrants  differ.
1    Moreover,  we  know  almost  nothing  about  the  labor  market 
behavior of  older immigrant workers – despite an explosion of research analyzing retirement 
decisions  more  generally.    These  gaps  are  unfortunate  because  in  many  countries  large 
numbers of immigrants are approaching retirement age.
2  The fiscal pressures stemming from 
an aging immigrant population will depend on immigrants’ retirement decisions and return 
migration patterns.  In particular, host countries will experience lower costs associated with 
old-age pensions and health care if immigrants delay their retirement or choose to return 
home in their old age.   
This  paper  fills  a  void  in  the  literature  by  investigating  the  relationship  between 
immigrants’ retirement status and the prevalence of return migration from the host country to 
their country of origin.  We begin by developing a simple theoretical model to illustrate that 
under reasonable conditions the probability of return migration is maximized at retirement.  
Despite a large, mainly theoretical, literature analyzing the return migration decision (see 
Dustmann and Weiss 2007 for a review), the effects of retirement on immigrants’ incentives 
to return home have been completely overlooked.  We use this framework to analyze the 
                                                 
1 Estimates suggest, for example, that between 20 and 50 percent of legal immigrants to the United States 
emigrated to another country in the 1960s and 1970s (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1982; Warren and Peck 1980).  See 
Dustmann and Weiss (2007) for a review of the evidence on the magnitude of return migration. 
2For example, in Australia fully 14.6 percent of the foreign-born population is between the ages of 55-64 in 
comparison to 7.9 percent of the Australian-born population (authors' calculations based on ABS 2003), while 
the proportion of the native- and foreign-born populations between the ages of 55-64 is virtually identical in 
Germany (12.4 vs. 12.6 percent) and the U.S. (20.5 vs. 20.2 percent) (Bauer et al. in press; Schmidley 2001).   2
retirement patterns of immigrants to Australia using data from the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey.  Australia is a particularly attractive country 
for  studying  the  effects  of  return  migration  on  the  age  profile  of  immigrant  retirement 
because nearly one in four individuals in the Australian population is foreign-born (ABS 
2007a) and, unlike the case in most countries, accurate data on return migration rates for 
individuals from different countries of birth are available.  We are particularly interested in 
the following questions.  First, how does the age profile of retirement differ for immigrants 
and the native-born?  Second, what role do compositional differences in the characteristics of 
native- and foreign-born populations play in producing these differences?  Finally, does the 
propensity for immigrants to be retired depend on the country-specific probability of return 
migration?   
We find that immigrants, particularly immigrant women, are more likely to be retired 
than are native-born men and women with the same demographic, human capital, and family 
characteristics.  Moreover, within the immigrant population, there is a negative relationship 
between  the  propensity  to  be  retired  and  the  return  migration  rate  of  one’s  fellow 
countrymen, particularly amongst men.  This link is strongest for those individuals who are at 
(or near) retirement age and among those with the highest cost of return migration.   
   
2.  The Previous Literature:  Return Migration and Immigrant Retirement 
 
The  economics  literature  on  return  migration  has  been  primarily  concerned  with 
understanding the incidence and optimal timing of this decision (Hill 1987; Stark et al. 1997; 
Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002; Dustmann 2003b).  While immigration itself typically stems 
from superior economic opportunities in the host country, immigrants’ return migration is 
assumed to be driven by preferences for (or lower costs of) consumption at home (Hill 1987; 
Djajić 1989; Dustmann 1997b; Stark et al. 1997) or concerns for one’s children (Dustmann   3
2003a). The potential for return migration has important consequences for immigrants’ host-
country decisions regarding work effort (Djajić 1989; Galor and Stark 1991), labor market 
participation (Dustmann 1997a), savings behavior (Galor and Stark 1990; Dustmann 1997b; 
Stark et al. 1997), and human capital investments (Dustmann 1999, 2007).  Immigrants who 
anticipate returning home to relatively unfavorable economic conditions are expected to have 
higher participation rates and to work harder than either permanent immigrants or the native-
born, for example (Galor and Stark 1991; Dustmann et al. 1997a).  Temporary migration may 
also reduce the incentives for human capital investment (Dustmann 1999, 2007), but increase 
the incentives for remittances (Merkle and Zimmermann 1992).  Finally, the effect of re-
migration on savings behavior depends on the wage differential and relative risk in the host 
and home countries (Dustmann 1997b).
3   
  Difficulties  in  measuring  return  migration  have  limited  empirical  analyses  of  this 
process.  As Dustmann and Weiss (2007) note, “there are typically no procedures in place 
that register immigrants who leave a country”.  At the macro level, this leaves researchers 
attempting to combine information from various censuses and surveys to infer the numbers 
(and characteristics) of immigrants who appear to have emigrated (e.g. Dustmann and Weiss 
2007).  At the micro level, researchers often rely on immigrants’ stated intensions regarding 
return  migration  to  understand  how  the  behavior  of  temporary  and  permanent  migrants 
differs.  The general conclusion is that immigrants who intend to emigrate both save and 
remit more than immigrants who intend to remain permanently in the host country (Merkle 
and Zimmermann 1992; Sinning 2007; Bauer and Sinning in press).   
  Previous  researchers  have  not  studied  the  link  between  immigrants’  intentions  to 
emigrate  and  the  timing  of  their  retirement  –  though  it  seems  reasonable  to  expect  one.  
Moreover, given the importance of wage differentials in economic models of the migration 
                                                 
3 Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) conclude that return migration intensifies the selection associated with the initial 
immigration process.   4
decision, it is surprising that theoretical models do not account for the effect of retirement on 
the incentives for return migration.
4  The empirical evidence certainly suggests that many 
immigrants anticipate either returning to their home country or moving frequently between 
the home and host countries after retirement (De Coulon and Wolff, 2006).
5  In what follows, 
we illustrate the theoretical effect of retirement in raising the incentives for immigrants to 
leave the host country and return home.  We subsequently assess the effect that the level of 
return migration has on the age profile of retirement in the immigrant population.   
 
 
3.  Theoretical Framework: The Effect of Retirement on Return Migration  
 
We begin by developing a simple model of the net benefit of return migration concentrating 
on immigrants’ decisions about where (rather than how much) to work.
6  Immigrants decide 
whether or not to return to their country of origin on the basis of the total future consumption 
achievable in the two countries until the end of life.  The model is static and we do not 
account for either uncertainty in — or the trajectory of — wages, prices, or consumption over 
time.  This simple approach allows us to abstract from unnecessary complexity.  Extensions 
of this basic framework are considered briefly below.   
Our main interest is in understanding how retirement affects the incentives for return 
migration.  An individual’s retirement date is assumed to be determined outside the model 
perhaps as a result of institutional arrangements that define the age at which he or she may 
access either public or employer-provided pension benefits. Consequently, immigrants save 
throughout their working lives to fund consumption in retirement.  We assume that retirement 
savings may be only partially portable and that transferring them to the origin country may 
involve  a  loss  of  benefits.    Finally,  we  assume  that  immigrants’  preferred  bundle  of 
                                                 
4 The exception is Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) who model the employment status of return migrants in the 
home country. 
5 This potential for return migration may provide a partial explanation for nativity differences in retirement 
expectations (Cobb-Clark and Stillman in press).  
6 See Hill (1987) who adopts a similar approach.   5
consumption goods is constant across countries, but that it is less costly in the origin than in 
the host country (see Stark et al. 1997; Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002).   
Time is continuous in the model.  Immigrants begin their lives in at  0 t =  in the host 
country and die at  1 t = .  Retirement occurs at time R  with0 1 R < < .  Consider first the 
savings process.  In the period prior to retirement, immigrants save a portion of their earnings 
to fund post-retirement consumption.  Accumulated retirement savings at time  t are then 
given by: 
 
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
H H H H H
t S D t w c D R w c t R c     = − + − − − −           (1) 
 
where
H w denotes host-country wages, 
H c is the consumption level in the host country, and  
D is a simple indicator variable which takes the value 1 in the pre-retirement period (t R < ) 
and 0 otherwise (t R ≥ ).  In the pre-retirement period ( 1 D = ), savings are equal to total 
earnings minus total consumption to date.  In the post-retirement period ( 0 D = ), savings 
equal the total savings accumulated at retirement minus any post-retirement consumption.  
Consumption levels are chosen so as to exhaust any savings at the end of life. 
Following  others  in  the  literature  (e.g.  Dustmann  1997a,  2007;  Dustmann  and 
Kichkamp 2002), we assume that at an exogenous time 
* t t =  immigrants make a decision 
whether or not to leave the host country and return home.  Immigrants benefit from return 
migration if their accumulated retirement savings and future earnings afford a higher standard 
of living in the origin country than in the host country.  Specifically, the net benefit to return 
migration at time 
* t  is given by the difference in future total consumption achievable in the 
two  countries.    Given  that  we  assume  that  there  are  no  bequests  and  all  resources  are 
exhausted at death, this implies that future consumption over ones remaining life time is 
equivalent  to  future  resources.    Immigrants  are  assumed  to  emigrate  whenever  the  net 
benefits from doing so are positive.  Return migration occurs, therefore, if and only if   6
* * * 0
O H




t R and  *
H
t R  are the future resources available at time 
* t if immigrants do and do not 
choose to return migrate, respectively.  More specifically, the net benefit to return migration 
at time 
* t can be written in terms of accumulated savings and any future earnings over ones 
remaining career as follows 
 
{ } { } * * *
* * 1
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O w captures origin-country wages,  C  represents a fixed cost (e.g. the loss of pension 
benefits, travel costs, etc.) associated with return migration.
7  The host-country price level is 
normalized to 1 and relative origin-country prices are given by p .  We assume 
O H w w <  and 
1 p <  implying that although economic opportunities are better in the host country than in the 
origin country, immigrants’ preferred consumption bundle is less expensive at home.   
  The net benefit to return migration will be positive at time 
* t if the resources available 
for consumption over an immigrant’s remaining life time are higher in the origin country than 
in the host country.  The last term in equation (2) reflects the total resources available if an 
immigrant decides to remain in the host country.  Total resources include retirement savings 
accumulated to time 
* t while working in the host country as well as an immigrant’s earnings 
over his or her remaining working life in the host country.  Post-return resources levels are 
given by the first term on the right-hand side of equation (2).  Although accumulated savings 
are the same ( * t S ), future resources will be lower in the origin country because 
O H w w <  and 
because return migrants must also pay the fixed costs associated with return migration (C ).  
                                                 
7 We ignore the effects of time discounting for simplicity   7
At the same time, each dollar of resources funds more consumption in the origin country 
because prices (p) are lower.  Consistent with other models in the literature (Djajić 1989; 
Dustmann 1997b; Stark et al. 1997), remigration may occur despite persistently higher host-
country wages because consumption is less expensive in the origin country. 
How  does  retirement  affect  the  probability  of  return  migration?    To  address  this 
question, we consider the way in which the incentives for return migration change over time 
both before and after retirement.  In the post-retirement period (
* t R ≥ ), immigrants choose 
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where  I denotes a simple indicator function and  M reflects the return migration decision.  
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Consequently, after retirement, return migration occurs if the costs of return migration (C ) 
— principally the loss of retirement savings — are less than the additional consumption made 
possible by consuming ones remaining savings in the origin country where prices are lower.  
Equation (5) implies that the change in the probability of return migration over time in the 











.        (6) 
 
Before retirement (i.e. in periods 
' t R < ), however, immigrants also take into account 
the effect that return migration will have on their future earnings.  Given the net benefit to   8
return  migration  shown  in  equation  (3),  immigrants  choose  to  return  migrate  in  the  pre-
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Substituting  accumulated  savings  and  rewriting  implies  that  immigrants  choose  to  return 
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Immigrants  return  migrate  before  retirement  only  if  the  advantages  of  consuming  ones 
accumulated savings in the origin country outweigh both the cost of return migration and the 
earnings  loss  associated  with  returning  to  a  low-wage  labor  market.    Consequently,  the 
change in the probability of return migration over the pre-retirement period is given by: 
 
Pr( 1)
( ) (1 )
H O H M
w w p c
t
∂ =
= − − −
∂
         (9) 
 
 
There are several things to note about these changes over time.  First, the probability 
of remigration declines over the post-retirement period so long as consumption in the origin 
country is less expensive than in the host country (i.e. 1 p < ) (see equation (6)).  Every year 
that return migration is delayed involves a loss associated with consuming in the higher price 
market which is no longer being compensated by the higher wages in the host country.  In the 
pre-retirement period, the probability of return migration increases every year so long as the   9
wage advantage afforded by the host country dominates the higher living costs.  This will be 
true whenever there is a positive economic return to immigration to the host country in the 
first place.  Together these relationships imply that the probability of return migration is 
maximized at the point of retirement when the wage advantage of the host country relative to 
the  origin  country  is  no  longer  relevant  and  the  consumption  benefits  of  moving  ones 
retirement savings to the lower cost country are maximized (see Figure 1).   
  Economic models of the immigration process typically rest upon the superior labor 
market opportunities in the host country.  Models of return migration, on the other hand, 
often rely upon lower costs of (or preferences for) consumption in the home country as the 
driving force behind the decision to leave the host country despite higher host-country wages 
(Djajić 1989; Dustmann 1997b; Stark et al. 1997).  In this context, our simple model is useful 
in highlighting the changes in the incentives for return migration that occur at retirement 
when higher relative wages are no longer a factor in immigrants’ decisions about whether to 
stay or to return home.  
  
3.  The Data 
3.1   The Household Income and Labour Dynamics Survey  
The main data source used for the analyses in this paper is the Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics  in  Australia  (HILDA)  Survey  which  collects  longitudinal  information  from  a 
nationally-representative  sample  of  more  than  7,600  Australian  households  encompassing 
almost 20,000 individuals aged 15 and older (see Wooden, et al. 2002).  As fully 22.1 percent 
of the Australian population is foreign-born (ABS 2007), the HILDA sample includes a large 
number of immigrants from a diversity of origin countries (eighty-eight, in fact).  Moreover, 
while many studies of retirement behavior are based only on samples of older individuals, 
each non-employed HILDA respondent aged 45 and over is asked about his or her retirement   10 
status.
8    The  ability  to  measure  retirement  status  among  several  cohorts  of  native-  and 
foreign-born workers makes HILDA data well suited to estimating nativity differences in the 
age profile of retirement.   
We pool the first five waves of HILDA data  covering the  years 2001 to 2005 to 
examine the retirement status of native- and foreign-born men and women over the age of 45.  
We have made a number of necessary sample restrictions.  Specifically, individuals under the 
age of 45 were not asked the retirement questions and have been dropped from the sample.  
This results in a sample of 7,728 individuals aged 45 and over.  We then drop a total of 457 
individuals who either 1) have never worked (218 individuals), 2) are Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islanders (92 individuals) or 3) are missing information for retirement status or other 
key variables of interest (88 individuals).  This leaves us with our main estimation sample of 
7,271 individuals, 5,117 of whom are native-born and 2,154 of whom are foreign-born. Each 
individual provides, on average, 3.8 waves of data, leading to 27,408 observations in our 
estimation sample.  Because retirement patterns are likely to depend on a number of factors 
which differ by region of origin, in much of our analysis we differentiate between immigrants 
from  English-speaking  (ESB)  and  non-English-speaking  (NESB)  background  countries.
9  
Details  about  individual  characteristics  by  gender  and  immigrant  status  are  shown  in 
Appendix Table 1.  
 
3.2 The Timing of Retirement among Immigrants and Natives 
 
We begin by examining the declared retirement status of the individuals in our sample (see 
Table 1).  The results indicate that immigrant women and immigrant men from non-English-
speaking backgrounds are more likely to report being retired when asked directly about their 
retirement status.  Overall, 39 per cent of Australian-born men and 40 percent of foreign-born 
                                                 
8 In particular, all non-employed respondents were asked “Have you retired (completely) from the workforce.”  
Response categories include: yes, no, and never worked.   
9 The English-speaking background countries are the United Kingdom, Ireland, United States, Canada, New 
Zealand and South Africa.   11 
men from English-speaking countries say that they have retired from the labor market.  In 
contrast, fully 45 percent of immigrant men from non-English-speaking backgrounds report 
being retired.  Retirement rates are also approximately five percentage points higher among 
immigrant women than among Australian-born women.   
Table 1 Here 
 
These aggregate retirement rates mask important variation in the timing of retirement 
across groups.  The incidence of retirement by age is shown in Figure 1.  In the absence of 
cohort effects on retirement, these figures can be interpreted as the cumulative distribution of 
retirement at different ages.  The relationship between region of origin and the retirement 
profile of immigrant men is particularly striking for men under the age of 60.  Retirement 
rates are much higher among male immigrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds than 
among immigrant men with English-speaking backgrounds.  By age 60, fully 44 percent of 
non-English-speaking background men say that they are retired in comparison to 30 percent 
of  English-speaking  background  men.    In  comparison,  approximately  37  percent  of 
Australian-born men have retired by age 60.  After age 60,  there is a sharp increase in the 
retirement rates of immigrant men from English-speaking countries so that by age 65 the 
cumulative  retirement  rate  of  immigrant  men  (approximately  80  percent)  is  largely 
independent of language background and is substantially higher than that of Australian-born 
men (62 percent).  The gap in the retirement rates of foreign- and native-born men does not 
completely close until after age 70. 
Figure 1 Here 
 
Not surprisingly, retirement occurs much earlier for women and at any given age a 
higher proportion of women than men report being retired.  Before the age of 55, however, 
the  relative  retirement  rates  of  women  mirror  those  of  men  with  English-speaking-
background immigrant women being less and non-English-speaking-background immigrant   12 
women being more likely to be retired than their native-born counterparts.  There is a rapid 
increase in retirement of immigrant women after age 55 so that by age 60 there are large 
disparities in retirement rates across groups.  While approximately 46 per cent of Australian-
born women are retired by age 60, this is true of 73 percent of immigrant women from non-
English-speaking  backgrounds  and  58  percent  of  women  from  English-speaking 
backgrounds.  This disparity is largely eliminated by age 65, however.   
Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  there  are  substantial  differences  in  the 
timing of retirement among the native-born, English-speaking-background immigrants and 
non-English-speaking-background  immigrants.    Immigrants  from  non-English-speaking 
backgrounds appear to retire earlier than other groups although by age 65 much of the gap 
has closed.  Thus, the story is one of early retirement.  The exception is that Australian-born 
men appear to be much more likely than foreign-born men to work past the age of 65.   
 
3.3 The Probability of Return Migration 
 
Although  most  countries  do  not  systematically  collect  information  on  emigrants  (see 
Dustmann and Weiss 2007), Australia is an exception.  Australia’s status as an island nation 
implies that all individuals entering or leaving the country do so through one of only seven 
international  airports.  Moreover,  each  person  entering  or  leaving  Australia  is  required  to 
provide the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) with a completed 
Incoming or Outgoing Passenger declaration at the airport.  These cards are legal documents 
and there are penalties for not filling them out completely or for making false statements.  
The data obtained from these cards are then matched to the personal information obtained 
from an electronic swipe of the person’s passport.
10   
                                                 
10 See http://wwww.immi.gov.au and http://www.infrastructure.gov.au for more information.   13 
We  use  the  published  statistics  on  permanent  departures  from  these  data  in 
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where  j  indexes  country  of  birth  (including  Australia), 
96 01
j E
−   is  the  total  number  of 
individuals born in country j who permanently left Australia between 1996 and 2001 and 
01
j P  
is the number of individuals enumerated in the 2001 Australia census who were born in 
country j.  This emigration rate for each country j is then matched to all individuals in our 
estimation sample who were born in that country.  The denominator of the ratio in equation 
(10) reflects the population of individuals from country j who would have resided in Australia 
in 2001 in the absence of emigration.  
Information about both the weighted (by sample size) and unweighted densities of 
emigration rates are provided in Figure 2. The emigration rate of immigrants to Australia 
ranges from 0.005 (Italy) to 0.090 (Hong Kong).
12  Immigrants from China, New Zealand, 
and Hong Kong have relatively high return migration rates, while immigrants from countries 
such as Italy, India and Germany are more like to remain in Australia.  Emigration rates are 
plotted  on  a  log-scale  in  each  graph  and,  as  can  be  seen  in  the  unweighted  results,  the 
distribution across countries in approximately log-normal.  We use a log-normal functional 
form for the emigration rate in all our descriptive results and regression analyses.  In all cases 
this provides a better model fit than when we treat emigration rates as a linear variable.   
Figure 2 Here 
                                                 
11 Specifically, permanent departures capture the number of those departing who report that they are leaving 
Australia permanently.  See Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2007) for emigration statistics and 
ABS (undated) for population statistics. 
12 Taiwan has the highest emigration rate in our sample at 0.097, but there are only 9 immigrants from Taiwan 
in HILDA as opposed to 51 from Hong Kong, thus we focus on Hong Kong when making comparisons.   14 
  Our theoretical model predicts that as the net benefits of return migration increase, the 
proportion of the immigrant population that chooses to remain in Australia after retirement 
falls.  Consequently, we expect immigrants from countries with high return migration rates to 
be on average younger and less likely to be retired.  We investigate this issue by plotting 
country-specific retirement rates for those aged 45 plus from HILDA and the proportion of 
the population aged 65 and older from each country of birth, as measured in the 2006 Census 
(ABS 2007b), against emigration rates (see Figures 3 and 4).  The size of the plot circles in 
Figure 3 are proportional to the HILDA sample size for men/women in each country and the 
solid line in each graph is the best linear fit of the data, with each point weighted by the 
HILDA  sample  size  for  men/women  in  each  country.  The  plot  circles  and  solid  line  are 
similarly defined in Figure 4, except the total female/male population in Australia from each 
country of birth are instead used as weights.  
Figures 3 and 4 Here 
These figures indicate that, as predicted by our theoretical model there is a large, 
negative,  and  significant  relationship  between  a  country’s  return  migration  rate  and  the 
fraction of the immigrant population in Australia that is retired or over age 65. For example, 
only 12.2 percent of men and 35.3 percent of women from New Zealand aged 45 plus are 
retired compared to 58.2 percent of men and 71.2 percent of women from Italy. Likewise, 
less than 10 percent of the New Zealand-born population in Australia is aged 65 plus, while 
over 50 percent of the Italian-born population in Australia is in this age-group.  
 
4.  Return Migration and Retirement Status 
4.1 Estimation Model 
To explore the link between return migration and the pattern of retirement in more depth, we 
estimate reduced-form models of retirement status controlling for individuals’ demographic   15 
and human capital characteristics.  This allows us to assess the role that differences in the 
composition of the immigrant and native-born populations play in explaining differences in 
retirement status across these groups.  Our objective is not to estimate a behavioral model of 
the retirement decision, but rather to understand the way the propensity to be retired at a point 
in time (i.e. retirement status) differs among subpopulations with different characteristics.  
Consequently, we adopt a cross-sectional estimator, pooling across HILDA waves to improve 
efficiency.
13     
We include in this regression model the emigration rate for the county of birth of each 
immigrant over the previous five year period (see equation (10)).  These emigration rates 
capture  the  cross-national  variation  in  institutional  arrangements,  price  levels,  etc.  that 
underlie the aggregate costs and benefits of emigration for individuals from each specific 
origin  country.    Since  the  incentives  for  return  migration  are  highest  at  retirement  (see 
Section 3), we expect to observe fewer individuals remaining in Australia after retirement 
when the benefits of return migration are higher (alternatively costs are lower).  In the limit, 
when return migration to country j is nearly universal, none of the immigrants from country j 
remaining in Australia would be retired. Thus, our theoretical model implies that we should 
find  a  negative  relationship  between  country-of-origin-specific  emigration  rates  and  the 
propensity for an individual to report being retired.   
  We assume that an individual’s propensity to be retired (
*
i R ) can be expressed as: 
*
ij ij j ij R X Z β φ ε = + +            (11) 
 
                                                 
13 Estimating a joint behavioural model of retirement and return migration decisions is also of great interest.  
However, this would require panel data which both includes information about labour force status and follows 
individuals who emigrate.  Such data does not currently exist.    16 
where i indexes individuals, ij X  captures demographic and human capital characteristics,  j Z  
is  the  return  migration  rate,  and  ij ε   is  a  random  error  term.    The  propensity  to  be  retired  is 
unobserved, so we create an indicator variable reflecting retirement status.  Specifically, 
 
Pr( 1) Pr( 0) ( ) ij ij j ij D X Z Q β φ ε γ = = + + > = Φ       (12) 
 
where  ( , ) ij j Q X Z = ,  ( , ) γ β φ = , andΦ is the standard normal cumulative density function.  
Finally, we assume that  ~ (0,1) ij N ε , is independent of the explanatory variables in equation 
(11) and is potentially clustered for individuals from the same country of birth, j.
14 
  
4.2 The Determinants of Retirement Status 
We begin by examining the determinants of declared retirement status for men and women 
aged 45 and older.  We consider three alternative specifications.  The first controls only for 
nativity status, year, region and remoteness, while the second adds controls for individuals’ 
demographic (a quadratic in age, marital status), human capital (education, a quadratic in 
labor  market  experience,  health  status)  and  household  (number  of  children/adults) 
characteristics.
15  The final specification also controls for return migration rates.
16  Estimation 
                                                 
14 Note that this also accounts for clustering over time in the error-term for a particular individual. As discussed 
in Moulton (1990), statistical inference can be seriously misleading when a regressor is measured at a more 
aggregated level than the observations in a regression, unless the regression allows for clustering at this more 
aggregated level. 
15 Specifications are as follows.  Model 1:  indicator variables for being born in an English speaking country 
other than Australia; being born in a non-English speaking country; waves 2–5, New South Wales (other than 
Sydney, default), the Australian Capital Territory, Melbourne, balance of Victoria, Tasmainia, Brisbane, balance 
of Queensland, Southern Australia, and Western Australia and Northern Territory; inner regional area, and outer 
regional/remote area (omitted category major city).  Model 2 also includes: quadratic in age; quadratic in years 
of work experience; indicator variables for finishing year 12, having a vocational certificate, having a tertiary 
degree; and being currently married (or cohabitating) as well as the length of this relationship; the number of 
individuals aged 0-15, 16-20 and 21 plus  in  the  household; and indicators for  good, average,  fair/poor, or 
missing self-reported health status. Model 3 also includes the log of the return migration rate (see equation (10)). 
Appendix table 1 reports summary statistics for all of the variables included in this analysis separately by gender 
and nativity status.     17 
results (marginal effects and standard errors) are reported separately by gender in Table 2.
17  
Alternative results from a model of non-employment (rather than declared retirement) are 
substantially the same and are reported in Appendix Table 2. 
  The results indicate that, when we do not control for differences in individual and 
household characteristics, immigrant men from non-English-speaking background countries 
are 8.6 percentage points more likely to report being retired than are native-born men, while 
men from English-speaking background countries have retirement rates that are equivalent to 
native-born Australians.  Immigrant women, irrespective of language background, are also 
somewhat  more  likely  to  report  being  retired  than  are  native-born  women,  though  the 
magnitude of the effect (between 4 and 5 percentage points) is smaller than that for men and 
is not significant at the 10 percent level.   
Table 2 Here 
  The relationship between nativity and retirement status falls by more than half for 
men once we control for differences in men’s age, education, experience, health, etc.  Thus, 
nativity differences in men’s retirement status are largely (though not completely) the result 
of compositional differences in the characteristics of native- and foreign-born populations.  In 
contrast, the nativity gap in women’s retirement status is magnified once we control for their 
characteristics.    Immigrant  women  from  English-speaking  backgrounds  are  fully  9.0 
percentage points more likely to be retired than otherwise similar native-born women, while 
non-English-speaking background women are 8.4 percentage points more likely to be retired.   
                                                                                                                                                        
16 In order to continue to include the Australia-born in this specification, we assign the emigration rate for 
Australian-born Australians of 0.6 percent to these individuals. Because indicator variables are included for 
being foreign-born, this has no impact on our estimates of the relationship between return migration rates and 
the likelihood of being retired, but instead affects the interpretation of the immigrant background indicator 
variables. As discussed below, we focus our discussion on country-specific predicted probabilities instead of 
these coefficients thus eliminating this interpretation problem. 
17 All estimation is performed in STATA 10.  Standard errors are calculated using the delta method accounting 
for clustering on country of birth. This also controls for clustering of individuals across time.     18 
Given the wide range of characteristics (in particular, age and health) accounted for in 
the  model,  these  large  differences  in  the  retirement  status  of  immigrant  and  native-born 
women are striking.  At the same time, analyses of immigrant women’s labor supply more 
broadly often conclude that the labor market assimilation profile that is typically observed for 
immigrant men does not easily generalize to immigrant women (e.g. Schoeni 1998; Blau et 
al.  2008).    Researchers  have  argued  that  immigrant  women’s  labor  supply  decisions  are 
perhaps  best  understood  as  investments  in  their  partners’  labor  market  assimilation  (e.g. 
Baker and Benjamin, 1997; Cobb-Clark and Crossley 2004) or in the context of gender roles 
(rather than work orientation) (Blau et al. 2008).  These perspectives are also likely to be 
useful in understanding immigrant women’s retirement decisions.   
Both men and women are more likely to be retired if they are older or have fewer 
labor market opportunities (i.e. less work experience, lower education, and poorer health).
18  
Retirement  status  also  appears  to  be  linked  to  household  composition.    Retirement  is 
substantially less common amongst those with teenage children at home, while retirement 
rates are also lower for those living in households with a relatively large number of other 
adults.  Although newly married men are 10.6 percentage points less likely to be retired, the 
incidence  of  retirement  increases  significantly  for  each  year  the  man  has  been  in  the 
relationship.  After 30 years of marriage (the sample mean), married men have retirement 
rates that are statistically the same as single men.  In contrast, newly married women are 
significantly more likely to be retired and this effect remains even after 30 years of marriage.  
These relationships between retirement status and individuals’ other demographic, human 
capital,  and  household  characteristics  are  unsurprising  and  are  consistent  with  a  growing 
literature analyzing the retirement decision (e.g. Lumsdaine and Mitchell 1999).   
                                                 
18 Table 2 reports the total marginal effect implied by the coefficients on both the linear and squared age terms.   19 
Finally, consistent with our theoretical model, we find a negative relationship between 
the  propensity  to  be  retired  and  the  return  migration  rate  of  one’s  fellow  countrymen.  
Specifically, in the absence of return migration, immigrant men would be expected to have 
retirement rates between 9.0 (English speaking background) and 8.4 (non English speaking 
background) percentage points higher than native-born men, while immigrant women would 
have retirement rates that were between 13.2 (English speaking background) and 10.3 (non 
English speaking background) percentage points higher.
19  The degree of return migration, 
however, is associated with a large fall in the propensity for immigrant men to be retired.  
The relationship between retirement status and return migration rates is also negative for 
women, though the effect is smaller and is not statistically significant.   
Table 3 Here 
To  highlight  the  combined  effect  of  English  language  background  and  return 
migration,  we  calculate  predicted  retirement  rates  holding  individuals’  characteristics 
constant at the overall sample mean (by gender) while varying immigrant status and return 
migration rates. In Table 3, we present the results for the five countries that each make up 
more than 4 percent of the foreign-born population in HILDA (in order of importance: UK; 
New  Zealand;  Italy;  Germany;  Netherlands)  and  three  important  Asian  countries  (China; 
Vietnam; and Hong Kong).  Comparing the two extremes, we see that men (women) from 
Hong Kong, which has a return migration rate of 9.0 percent, are 21.6 (9.6) percentage points 
less likely to be retired compared to individuals from Italy, which has a return migration rate 
of 0.5 percent, holding everything else constant.  This disparity implies that the national-
origin  mix  of  the  immigrant  inflow  has  important  implications  for  the  extent  of  return 
migration as well as the retirement status (and age structure) of the immigrant population.   
                                                 
19 Note that the interpretation of the coefficients on the indicator variables for immigrant status differs across 
models.  In particular, while in model 2 the effect of immigrant status is effectively evaluated at the mean return 
migration rate, in model 3 these same effects are evaluated at a return migration rate of 0.  In Table 3, we 
calculate  predicted  retirement  rates  holding  individuals’  characteristics  constant  at  the  mean  for  the  entire 
sample and varying immigrant status and return migration rates.     20 
 
4.3  Retirement Status and Return Migration Rates:  Variation Across Age-Groups 
All of the above results account for the effect of age on the propensity to be retired.  Not 
surprisingly, we find that retirement rates are higher  among older individuals.  Still, this 
leaves open the possibility that the effects of return migration differ depending on the age of 
the individual.  In particular, our theoretical model indicates that the link between retirement 
status  and  return  migration  should  be  the  strongest  for  individuals  who  are  closest  to 
retirement age.  We address this issue by re-estimating the three specifications described 
above for four separate age-groups.  These age-groups are defined differently for men and 
women to take into account the fact that Australian women typically retire somewhat earlier 
than Australian men (see Cobb-Clark and Stillman in press).  The predicted retirement rates 
(evaluated at the sample means by gender and age-group) implied by these estimates are 
reported  separately  by  gender  in  Table  4,  while  selected  marginal  effects  (and  standard 
errors) are presented in Appendix Table 3.
20 
Table 4 Here 
  We find no significant effect of return migration rates on the retirement status of men 
between  the  ages  of  60  and  64  or  for  those  aged  69  and  older  (see  Appendix  Table  3).  
Among relatively  young men (aged 45 – 59), however, higher return migration rates are 
associated  with  a  somewhat  lower  propensity  to  be  retired.    There  is  also  a  negative 
relationship  between  the  propensity  of  men  aged  65  to  69  to  be  retired  and  the  return 
migration rate of their fellow countrymen.  This effect is quite substantial.  Specifically, 
while  almost  all  men  aged  65  to  69  from  Italy  (92.4  percent)  or  the  Netherlands  (87.8 
percent) are predicted to be retired, this is true of only two-thirds (64.6 percent) of men from 
China and half (54.2 percent) of men from Hong Kong.  These are dramatic differences given 
                                                 
20 All models include the full set of controls as described above, however, we report only selected results in 
Appendix Table 3.  Complete results are available upon request.     21 
that we are controlling for differences in the human capital and demographic characteristics 
of men from different origin countries.   
Retirement status is linked to return migration rates only for women between the ages of 
60 and 64.  In this age group, however, the effect of return migration rates on retirement 
status is dramatic.  Specifically, women in this age range from countries such as Italy and the 
Netherlands are almost 30 percentage points more likely to be retired than are otherwise 
similar  women  from  countries  such  as  New  Zealand  or  Hong  Kong  for  which  return 
migration rates are higher.   
It  is  striking  that  the  effect  of  return  migration  rates  on  retirement  status  is  most 
pronounced for the cohort of 65 – 69 year old men and 60 – 64 year old women.  Although 
the institutional details of employer-provided pension plans can vary, Australian men (both 
citizens and permanent residents) qualify for the Age Pension provided by the Australian 
government at age 65, while Australian women born before June 30, 1944 qualify at age 63.
21  
Thus, taken together, our results strongly suggest that – consistent with our expectations – the 
link between retirement status and return migration is strongest for those individuals who are 
at (or near) retirement age.   
   
4.4 Retirement Status and Return Migration Rates:  The Effect of Citizenship 
Our theoretical model demonstrates that the retirement status of immigrant populations can 
be directly linked to the costs and benefits of return migration.  Groups that face a high cost 
(or low benefit) of return migration are expected to be disproportionately likely to remain in 
the  host  country  after  retirement.    In  the  preceding  analysis,  we  have  used  the  return 
migration  rate  of  one’s  fellow  countrymen  as  a  convenient  proxy  for  the  cross-national 
variation in the costs and benefits of return migration faced by different immigrant groups.  
                                                 
21 See www.centrelink.gov.au.     22 
Here, we move on to examine whether – within immigrant populations – there is evidence 
that specific groups with higher costs of return migration are in fact disproportionately likely 
to remain in Australia (i.e. have higher average retirement rates).   
We do this by re-estimating our model of retirement status classifying origin countries, 
not on the basis of their language background, but rather on the basis of whether or not they 
permit dual citizenship.  This is then interacted with an indicator for  whether or not the 
respondent has become a naturalized Australian citizen.
22  Of the 70 origin countries available 
for this analysis, 40 allow dual citizenship. Among immigrants from the countries allowing 
dual  citizenship  76.2  percent  have  become  naturalised  Australian  citizens,  while  the 
corresponding rate for immigrants from countries that do not allow dual citizenship is 88.8 
percent.  We expect that immigrants who have become naturalized citizens despite coming 
from  a  country  which  does  not  allow  dual  citizenship  will  have  higher  costs  of  return 
migration and will be disproportionately likely to remain in Australia after retirement.  On the 
other hand, immigrants who fail to become naturalized citizens even though they could do so 
without giving up their original citizenship may feel less attachment to Australia and may be 
more likely to return home at retirement.
23   
Table 5 Here 
  Table 5 presents the predicted retirement rates implied from this model estimated on 
both the samples of men and women and stratified by gender and age-group (see Appendix 
Table 4 for selected marginal effects).  We find that among immigrants from countries that do 
                                                 
22 Specifically, we drop our indicators for English-speaking- and non-English-speaking background from the 
model and instead add indicators for 1) naturalized Australian citizen from non-dual-citizenship country; 2) 
naturalized  Australia  citizen  from  dual-citizenship  country;  3)  not  an  Australian  citizen  from  a  non-dual-
citizenship  country;  and  4)  not  an  Australian  citizen  from  a  dual-citizenship  country.    The  data  on  dual 
citizenship come from Brenchley (2000) and Renshon (2000).  Data for 74 individuals from 18 countries were 
excluded  from  this  analysis  because  information  was  not  available  on  whether  these  countries  allow  dual 
citizenship. A further 546 individuals were dropped from this analysis because they attrited from HILDA prior 
to wave 5 when the citizenship data was first collected.  Selected marginal effects (and standard errors) are 
presented in Appendix Table 4.  Complete results are available upon request. 
23 The Australian government actively encourages immigrants to take up Australian citizenship.  Immigrants 
entering Australia before July 1, 2007 are qualified to become Australian citizens after two years of permanent 
residence (www.immi.gov.au).   23 
not allow dual citizenship (for example, Germany, India, Vietnam and China) there is a great 
deal of disparity in the retirement rates of those who have and have not become naturalized 
citizens.  Specifically, men who are naturalized Australians (and were required to give up 
their original citizenship) are 24.9 percentage points more likely to be retired than those who 
are not, while women who gave up their original citizenship to become Australian citizens 
are 13.3 percentage points more likely to be retired.  The magnitude of this difference is 
striking given that we have controlled for differences in demographic (most notably age) and 
human capital characteristics.   
We also find a positive effect of having Australian citizenship on the retirement rates 
of immigrants from countries that do allow dual citizenship status.  This effect, however, is 
much smaller (less than two percentage points) and not statistically significant indicating that 
for immigrants from these countries the decision to naturalize may not be closely linked to 
ones  attachment  to  Australia  or  the  costs  of  returning  home  again.    On  the  other  hand, 
immigrants who have given up their original citizenship to become Australia citizens are 
more much likely to face high costs of return migration.  These costs are then reflected in the 
proportion of individuals who choose to remain in Australia after retirement.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
This  paper  analyzes  the  relationship  between  immigrants’  retirement  status  and  the 
prevalence of return migration from Australia to their country of origin.  Understanding this 
relationship is important because immigrants’ decisions about when to retire and where to 
spend their retirement years drives the extent to which immigrant aging will result in an 
increased demand for health care or old-age pensions.   
Our theoretical model demonstrates that under reasonable conditions the incentives to 
return  migrate  are  greatest  at  retirement  implying  that  there  is  a  direct  link  between  the   24 
prevalence  of  return  migration  among  and  the  retirement  status  of  different  immigrant 
populations.  Our empirical results indicate that immigrants to Australia are more likely to be 
retired than are native-born Australians.  This nativity gap in retirement status persists despite 
extensive  controls  for  demographic,  human  capital,  and  family  characteristics  and  is 
especially large for immigrant women.  Immigrants’ propensity to be retired decreases as the 
return migration rate of their countrymen increases, however.  This relationship is strongest 
for men, for those who are close to retirement age and for with the highest cost of return 
migration.   
These results point to several important policy conclusions.  First, as return migration 
rates vary substantially across sending countries, it is also the case that the age structure and 
composition  of  the  domestic  labor  force  in  the  years  ahead  rests  fundamentally  on  the 
national origin mix of today’s immigration flow.  In short, immigrant selection policies have 
direct  consequences  for  the  funding  of  old  age  pensions.    Moreover,  institutional 
arrangements  surrounding  the  eligibility  for  citizenship,  access  to  (and  portability  of) 
pensions,  the  provision  of  health  care,  etc.  are  likely  to  affect  the  net  benefits  to  return 
migration and will therefore have far reaching consequences for the age composition of the 
immigrant population.  Most of these relationships have received little attention and are not 
yet  well  understood.    Modeling  the  linkages  between  return  migration  and  retirement 
behavior (as we have done here), however, provides a useful way of beginning to think about 
the complex relationships between a range of domestic policies and demographic transitions 
within the immigrant population.   
At the same time, these results leave open a number of important questions for future 
research.  In particular, while some researchers have linked return migration to the incentives 
to accumulate savings or to send remittances (e.g. Galor and Stark 1990; Dustmann 1997b; 
Stark et al. 1997), it would be useful to understand how the potential for return migration is   25 
linked to the specific ways that immigrants fund their retirement.  It seems sensible to expect 
that immigrants who intend to return home will have strong incentives to diversify their risk 
by saving both at home and abroad (Dustmann 1997b; Osili 2007).  But what does this imply 
about the types of assets that immigrants hold?  To what extent are decisions about home 
ownership or financial assets driven by expectations regarding return migration?  Answers to 
these questions are important because consumption expenditures depend not only on wealth 
levels, but also on the composition of wealth, and because assets differ in terms of their 
expected rates of return, riskiness, and liquidity leading them to serve different functions in 
providing for a household's financial security (Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand in press).   
  Finally, we need to know more about gender differences in immigrants’ patterns of 
retirement and return migration.  Making progress in this area is likely to require a household 
perspective of the  return migration decision similar to that used to understand the initial 
immigration  process  (Mincer  1978).    Our  results,  for  example,  point  to  a  much  closer 
relationship between the level of return migration and the retirement status of immigrant men.  
This  may  suggest  that  for  many  women  the  decision  to  return  migrate  –  like  the  initial 
decision  to  immigrate  –  is  based  on  family  (rather  than  individual  returns).    Moreover, 
women’s retirement also needs to be understood in a household context.  Specifically, we 
need to know more about the ways in which expectations regarding return migration, cultural 
differences in attitudes towards women, gender differences in assimilation profiles, etc. lead the age 
profile of retirement to differ for immigrant men and women.   26 
References: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) no date.  Birthplace of Individual by Sex, Counts of 
Persons  for  Australia,  2001  Census  Classification  Counts.    Commonwealth  of 
Australia, Catalogue, 2022.0. – downloaded at www.abs.gov.au 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2003.  Expanded Community Profile, 2001 Census 
Community Profile Series.  Commonwealth of Australia, Catalogue, 2005.0. 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2007a.  Country of Birth of Person (Full Classification 
List) by Sex, 2006 Census of Population and Housing.  Commonwealth of Australia, 
Catalogue, 2068.0. 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2007b.  Country of Birth of Person by Age by Sex, 
2006 Census of Population and Housing.  Commonwealth of Australia, Catalogue, 
2068.0. 
 
Baker,  Michael,  and  Dwayne  Benjamin.  1997,  “The  Role  of  the  Family  in  Immigrants' 
Labour  Market  Activity:  An  Evaluation  of  Alternative  Explanations.”  American 
Economic Review, 87(4), pp.705-27. 
 
Bauer, Thomas K., Cobb-Clark, Deborah. A., Hildebrand, Vincent. and Sinning, Mathis, in 
press,  “A  Comparative  Analysis  of  the  Nativity  Wealth  Gap”,  Economic  Inquiry, 
forthcoming.  
 
Brenchley, Fred, 2000. “Subject to Change”, The Bulletin, 6 June 2000. 
 
Blau, Francine D., Kahn, Lawrence M., Moriarty, Joan Y. and Souza, Andre Portela, 2003, 
“The Role of the Family in Immigrants’ Labour-Market Activity:  Evidence from the 
United States”, American Economic Review, Vol. 91(1), March, pp. 429-447. 
 
Blau, Francine D., Kahn, Lawrence M., and Papps, Kerry L., 2008, “Gender Source Country 
Characteristics and Labor Market Assimilation Among Immigrants: 1980 – 2000” IZA 
Discussion Paper 3725, October.  
 
Bauer, Thomas K. and Sinning, Mathias, in press, “The Savings Behavior of Temporary and 
Permanent Migrants in Germany” Journal of Population Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Borjas, George and Bratsberg, Bernt, 1996, “Who Leaves? The Outmigration of the Foreign-
Born”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78(1), February, pp. 165 – 176. 
 
Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Crossley, Thomas F. YEAR, “Revisiting the Family Investment 
Hypothesis”, Labour Economics, Vol. 11(3), June, pp. 373 – 393.  
 
Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Stillman, Steven, in press, “The Retirement Expectations of 
Middle-Age Australians”, Economic Record, forthcoming. 
 
Cobb-Clark,  Deborah  A.  and  Hildebrand,  Vincent  A.,  in  press,  “The  Asset  Portfolios  of 
Native-born  and  Foreign-born  Australian  Households”,  Economic  Record, 
forthcoming. 
   27 
De Coulon, Augustin and Wolff, François-Charles, 2006, “The Location of Immigrants at 
Retirement:  Stay/Return or `Va-et-Vient’?” IZA Discussion Paper 2224, July. 
 
Department  of  Immigration  and  Citizenship,    2007,    Emigration  2006-07  Australia.  
Commonwealth of Australia, ISSN 1324-3411. 
 
Djajić,  Slobodan,  1989,  “Migrants  in  a  Guest-Worker  System”  Journal  of  Development 
Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 327 – 339. 
 
Dustmann, Christian 1997a, “Differences in the Labor Market Behavior between Temporary 
and Permanent Migrant Women”, Labour Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 29 – 46. 
 
Dustmann,  Christian,  1997b,  “Return  Migration,  Uncertainty  and  Precautionary  Savings” 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 52, pp. 295-316. 
 
Dustmann, Christian, 1999. “Temporary Migration, Human Capital and Language Fluency of 
Migrants”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 101(2), pp. 297 – 314. 
 
Dustmann,  Christian,  2003a,  “Children  and  Return  Migration”,  Journal  of  Population 
Economics, Vol. 16, pp. 815-830. 
 
Dustmann,  Christian,  2003b,  “Return  Migration,  Wage  Differentials,  and  the  Optimal 
Migration Duration”, European Economic Review, Vol. 47, pp. 353-369. 
 
Dustmann, Christian, 2007, “Return Migration, Investment in Children, and Intergenerational 
Mobility:  Comparing Sons of Foreign and Native Born Fathers”, IZA  Discussion 
Paper 3080, September. 
 
Dustmann, Christian and Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2002, “The Optimal Migration Duration and 
Activity Choice after Re-Migration” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 67, pp. 
351-372. 
 
Dustmann, Christian and Weiss, Yoram, 2007, “Return Migration:  Theory and Empirical 
Evidence from the UK”, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 45(2), June, pp. 
236 – 256. 
 
Galor, Oded and Stark, Oded, 1990, “Migrants’ Savings, the Probability of Return Migration 
and Migrants’ Performance”, International Economic Review, Vol. 31(2), May, pp. 
463-467. 
 
Galor, Oded and Stark, Oded, 1991, “The Probability of Return Migration, Migrants’ Work 
Effort, and Migrants’ Performance”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 
399 – 405. 
 
Hill,  John  K.,  1987,  “Immigrant  Decisions  Concerning  Duration  of  Stay  and  Migratory 
Frequency”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 221- 234. 
 
Jasso, Guillermina and Rosenzweig, Mark, 1982, “Estimating the Emigration Rates of Legal 
Immigrants using Administrative and Survey Data: the 1971 Cohort of Immigrants to 
the United States”, Demography, Vol. 19, pp. 279-290.    28 
 
Lumsdaine, Robin L. and Mitchell, Olivia S., 1999, “New Developments in the Economic 
Analysis of Retirement,” in: O. Ashenfelter  & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor 
Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 49, pp. 3261-3307. 
 
Merkle,  Lucie  and  Zimmermann,  Klaus  F.,  1992,  “Savings  Remittances,  and  Return 
Migration”, Economic Letters, Vol. 38, pp. 77 – 81. 
 
Mincer, Jacob, 1978, ‘Family Migration Decisions’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, 
pp. 749–773. 
 
Moulton,  B.,  1990,  “An  Illustration  of  a  Pitfall  in  Estimating  the  Effects  of  Aggregate 
Variables on Micro Units,” Review of Economics and Statistics, pp. 334-338. 
 
Osili, Una Okonkwo, 2007, “Remittances and Savings from International Migration:  Theory 
and Evidence Using A Matched Sample”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 
83, pp. 446 – 465. 
 
Renshon, Stanley, 2000, “Dual Citizens in America: An Issue of Vast Proportions and Broad 
Significance”,  Backgrounder,  Center  for  Immigration  Studies,  Washington,  USA, 
July. 
 
Schmidley, D. A. 2001. Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2000. 
Current Population Reports, Series P23-206. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
Schoeni, Robert F., 1998, “Labor Market Assimilation of Immigrant Women” Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 51(3), April, pp. 483 – 504. 
 
Sinning, Mathias, 2007, Determinants of Savings and Remittances:  Empirical Evidence from 
Immigrants to Germany” IZA Discussion Paper, August. 
 
Stark,  Oded,  Helmenstein,  Christian,  and  Yegorov,  Yury,  1997,  “Migrants’  Savings, 
Purchasing Power Parity, and the Optimal Duration of Migration” International Tax 
and Public Finance, Vol. 4, pp. 307-324.   
 
United Nations (UN) 2006. Trends in Total Migrant Stock:  The 2005 Revision CC-ROM 
Documentation,  Department  of  Economic  and  Social  Affairs,  Population  Division 
February 2006. 
 
Warren,  Robert  and  Peck,  Jennifer  M.,  1980,  “Foreign-born  Emigration  from  the  United 
States”, Demography, Vol. 17, pp. 71 – 84. 
 
Wooden,  M.,  Friden,  S.,  and  Watson,  N.,  2002.  “The  Household  Income  and  Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey:  Wave 1” Australian Economic Review, Vol. 




















































































































































































45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Age
































































































































.001 .003 .005 .007 .01 .02 .03 .04 .04 .06 .08 .1
Emigration Rate 1996-2001Netherlands
Italy











































































































































































































































































































































































































































.001 .003 .005 .01 .02 .03.04 .04 .06.08.1





Men 0.39 0.40 0.45
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 9,344 2,016 2,039
Individuals 2,467 518 604
Percent of Individuals 69% 14% 17%
Women 0.47 0.52 0.51
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 10,266 1,913 1,830
Individuals 2,650 495 537
Percent of Individuals 72% 13% 15%
Note: See the paper for further information about how the sample is created and variables are defined.










English Bckgrnd Immigrant 0.023 -0.023 0.074+ 0.048 0.090** 0.132*
(0.057) (0.035) (0.042) (0.054) (0.028) (0.052)
Other Immigrants 0.086** 0.039+ 0.084** 0.041 0.084** 0.103**
(0.027) (0.020) (0.025) (0.035) (0.027) (0.033)
Log Emigration Rate -0.076* -0.034
(0.032) (0.037)
Age 0.105** 0.106** 0.093** 0.093**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008)
Age-Squared / 100 -0.019 -0.020 -0.029** -0.030**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008)
Combined Effect at Age 60 0.081** 0.081** 0.056** 0.056**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Work Experience -0.009 -0.009 -0.013** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Work Exp-Squared/100 -0.046** -0.046** -0.006+ -0.006+
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003)
Combined Eff at 38(M)/25(W) -0.044** -0.044** -0.016** -0.016**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Ed = Year 12 -0.151** -0.150** -0.085** -0.082*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.034)
Ed = Certificate -0.065** -0.065** -0.074** -0.074**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Ed = Tertiary -0.280** -0.279** -0.275** -0.272**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.029) (0.027)
Good Health 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.023
(0.046) (0.047) (0.031) (0.031)
Average Health 0.095+ 0.095+ 0.119** 0.120**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.042) (0.042)
Fair / Poor Health 0.361** 0.361** 0.305** 0.305**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036)
Missing Health / SCQ 0.169** 0.171** 0.181** 0.181**
(0.058) (0.059) (0.054) (0.054)
Married/Cohab -0.106** -0.107** 0.079** 0.079**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.030)
Years Partnered/10 0.029** 0.028** 0.001 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Combined Eff at 30 Years -0.020 -0.022 0.079** 0.079**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Number Kids 0-15 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Number Kids 16-20 -0.066* -0.065* -0.080** -0.080**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.010) (0.009)
Number Adults 21+ -0.031** -0.030** -0.029** -0.029**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Pseudo R-squared 0.005 0.580 0.580 0.005 0.547 0.547
Observations 13,399 13,399 13,399 14,009 14,009 14,009
Men
Table 2: Probit Model of Likelihood of Being Retired Stratified by Gender
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses that allow for clustering for at the disaggregate country level which
includes accounting for clustering of individuals across time. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. All regressions include
year, region and remoteness dummies. The three row labelled 'combined eff' present the total marginal effect
implied by the coefficients on both the linear and squared age terms, by the coefficients on both the linear and
squared work experience terms, and by the coefficients on both the indicator variables for being married and the
linear term for length of marriage, evaluated at particular points in the distribution of these variables.
(Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
WomenEmigration Rate Men Women
Italy 0.005 0.482 0.633
Netherlands 0.009 0.436 0.614
Germany  0.010 0.423 0.609
India 0.011 0.422 0.608
Vietnam 0.014 0.398 0.598
United Kingdom 0.018 0.371 0.620
China  0.050 0.306 0.557
New Zealand 0.065 0.279 0.578
Hong Kong  0.090 0.266 0.537
Australia  NA 0.379 0.522
Table 3: Predicted Probability of Being Retired for Individual with Mean Characteristics 
from Different Countries by Gender
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated using the coefficients from the third specification in Table 2,
setting all characteristics to the sample mean by gender besides the immigrant status indicator variables and
the emigration rate, which are both set to the appropriate level for a particular country. The UK and New
Zealand are the only countries with an English-speaking background.Emigration
Rate Age < 60 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age > 69 Age < 55 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age > 64
Italy 0.005 0.084 0.511 0.924 0.981 0.061 0.387 0.900 0.985
Netherlands 0.009 0.057 0.511 0.878 0.982 0.055 0.387 0.860 0.985
Germany  0.010 0.051 0.511 0.862 0.982 0.053 0.387 0.846 0.985
India 0.011 0.051 0.511 NA 0.982 0.053 0.387 0.845 0.985
Vietnam 0.014 0.041 0.511 0.827 0.983 0.050 0.387 0.818 NA
United Kingdom 0.018 0.026 0.416 0.947 0.980 0.061 0.347 0.782 0.992
China  0.050 0.015 0.510 0.646 0.984 0.038 0.387 0.683 0.986
New Zealand 0.065 0.009 0.416 0.848 0.981 0.048 0.347 0.631 0.992
Hong Kong  0.090 0.009 0.510 0.542 NA 0.034 0.387 0.607 0.986
Australia  NA 0.043 0.444 0.811 0.976 0.047 0.319 0.619 0.979
Women Men
Table 4: Predicted Probability of Being Retired for Individual with Mean Characteristics from Different Countries by Gender and Age-Group
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated using the coefficients from the third specification in Table 4, setting all characteristics to the sample mean by gender and age-
group besides the immigrant status indicator variables and the emigration rate, which are both set to the appropriate level for a particular country. The UK and New
Zealand are the only countries with an English-speaking background. Cells with 'NA' indicate that there are no immigrants in HILDA from a particularly country in that
gender and age-group.Emigration Allows Dual
Rate Citizenship OZ Citizen Non-Citizen OZ Citizen Non-Citizen OZ Citizen Non-Citizen OZ Citizen Non-Citizen OZ Citizen Non-Citizen
Germany  0.010 No 0.615 0.366 0.208 0.034 0.611 0.366 0.865 0.917 NA NA
India 0.011 No 0.614 0.365 0.206 0.033 0.609 0.365 NA NA NA NA
Vietnam 0.014 No 0.580 0.333 0.164 0.023 NA NA 0.841 0.900 NA NA
China  0.050 No 0.442 0.217 0.054 0.004 0.476 0.247 NA NA NA NA
Italy 0.005 Yes 0.520 0.504 0.142 0.092 0.518 0.600 0.987 0.943 0.961 0.984
Netherlands 0.009 Yes 0.455 0.439 0.086 0.052 0.468 0.550 0.979 0.918 0.959 0.982
United Kingdom 0.018 Yes 0.377 0.362 0.042 0.024 0.407 0.488 0.964 0.877 0.956 0.981
New Zealand 0.065 Yes 0.250 0.238 0.009 0.004 0.303 0.379 0.918 0.773 0.951 0.978
Emigration Allows Dual
Rate Citizenship OZ Citizen Non-Citizen OZ Citizen Non-Citizen OZ Citizen Non-Citizen OZ Citizen Non-Citizen OZ Citizen Non-Citizen
Germany  0.010 No 0.712 0.579 0.073 0.038 0.393 0.341 NA NA NA NA
India 0.011 No 0.712 0.579 0.073 0.038 0.393 0.342 NA NA NA NA
Vietnam 0.014 No 0.710 0.576 0.075 0.040 0.395 0.343 NA NA NA NA
China  0.050 No 0.699 0.564 0.086 0.046 0.403 0.351 NA NA NA NA
Italy 0.005 Yes 0.628 0.621 0.047 0.040 0.336 0.343 0.825 0.856 0.994 0.992
Netherlands 0.009 Yes 0.623 0.615 0.050 0.043 0.340 0.346 0.795 0.830 0.994 0.991
United Kingdom 0.018 Yes 0.616 0.608 0.054 0.046 0.344 0.351 0.755 0.794 0.994 0.991
New Zealand 0.065 Yes 0.604 0.596 0.062 0.053 0.352 0.359 0.674 0.719 0.993 0.990
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated using the coefficients from the second specification in Table 6, setting all characteristics to the sample mean by gender and age-
group besides the citizenship variables and the emigration rate, which are both set to the appropriate level for a particular country. Cells with 'NA' indicate that there are no
immigrants in HILDA from a particularly country in that gender and age-group or that the interaction term was not identified in the regression model.
Women
Overall Age < 55 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age > 64
Men
Age > 69 Overall Age < 60 Age 60-64 Age 65-69
















Age 59.7 61.0 60.0 60.4 60.8 59.2
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2)
Years of Work Experience 38.0 38.6 35.6 25.1 28.2 25.1
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.3)
Ed = Year 11 or less 0.38 0.28 0.26 0.56 0.43 0.43
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Ed = Year 12 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.17
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Ed = Certificate 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.21 0.26 0.21
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Ed = Tertiary 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.19
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Excellent Health 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.05
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Good Health 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.29 0.31 0.19
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Average Health 0.34 0.39 0.32 0.36 0.35 0.31
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Appendix Table 1: Characteristics by Gender and Immigration Status
Men Women
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Fair / Poor Health 0.24 0.18 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.28
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Missing Health / SCQ 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.17
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Married/Cohab 0.76 0.81 0.87 0.63 0.66 0.67
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Years if Married/Cohab 30.1 30.0 29.6 31.6 30.3 30.3
(0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.4)
Number Kids 0-15 0.33 0.26 0.41 0.21 0.19 0.21
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number Kids 16-20 0.19 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.20
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Number Adults 21+ 1.96 1.96 2.18 1.85 1.84 2.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Sydney 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.18 0.23
Rest of NSW / ACT 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.10
Melbourne 0.14 0.13 0.30 0.15 0.16 0.30
Rest of Victoria / Tasmania 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.06
Brisbane 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.04
Rest of QLD 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.04
South Australia 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.12
Western Australia and NT 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.16 0.10
Major City 0.51 0.67 0.83 0.55 0.70 0.82
Inner Regional 0.31 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.19 0.12
Outer Regional / Remote 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.06
Observations 9,344 2,016 2,039 10,266 1,913 1,830
Individuals 2,467 518 604 2,650 495 537
Percent of Individuals 69% 14% 17% 72% 13% 15%
Note: See the paper for further information about how the sample is created and variables are defined.Overall Age 45-59 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age > 69 Overall Age 45-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age > 64
English Bckgrnd Immigrant 0.081* 0.027 0.022 0.161** 0.008 0.107* 0.088 0.049 0.198** 0.008**
(0.040) (0.020) (0.062) (0.019) (0.006) (0.048) (0.072) (0.075) (0.029) (0.003)
Other Immigrants 0.087** 0.059** 0.071 0.073* -0.001 0.102** 0.083+ 0.101 0.192** 0.003
(0.030) (0.022) (0.048) (0.032) (0.008) (0.030) (0.043) (0.067) (0.037) (0.004)
Log Emigration Rate -0.040 -0.026* 0.025 -0.105* -0.001 -0.009 -0.010 0.014 -0.046 -0.003
(0.025) (0.013) (0.048) (0.046) (0.007) (0.032) (0.032) (0.048) (0.037) (0.004)
Age 0.051** 0.039** 0.105** 0.052** 0.006** 0.034** 0.028** 0.037** 0.054** 0.003**
(0.011) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) 0.000
Age-Squared/100 0.029** 0.010
(0.009) (0.007)
Years of Work Experience -0.014** -0.001 0.127** 0.104** 0.005** -0.016** -0.020** -0.020** -0.005 0.002**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 0.000
Work Exp-Squared/100 -0.053** -0.041** -0.229** -0.155** -0.009** -0.001 0.008 0.000 -0.015** -0.004**
(0.009) (0.005) (0.020) (0.009) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001)
Ed = Year 12 -0.138** -0.076** -0.046 0.033 -0.015** -0.064+ -0.010 -0.093 -0.098 -0.026
(0.020) (0.007) (0.044) (0.043) (0.004) (0.038) (0.021) (0.062) (0.166) (0.021)
Ed = Certificate -0.070** -0.066** -0.015 -0.029 -0.002 -0.049** -0.037 -0.051+ -0.058 -0.002
(0.013) (0.005) (0.028) (0.020) (0.002) (0.012) (0.028) (0.030) (0.051) (0.003)
Ed = Tertiary -0.330** -0.144** -0.322** -0.220** -0.060** -0.212** -0.127** -0.225** -0.084** -0.064**
(0.017) (0.007) (0.033) (0.030) (0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.018) (0.026) (0.015)
Good Health 0.010 -0.027* 0.082* 0.025 0.011 0.009 0.017 0.004 -0.099+ 0.001
(0.035) (0.013) (0.040) (0.021) (0.007) (0.019) (0.015) (0.042) (0.056) (0.002)
Average Health 0.080* 0.005 0.120* 0.090** 0.018 0.105** 0.071** 0.135* 0.019 0.010**
(0.034) (0.014) (0.048) (0.015) (0.013) (0.026) (0.017) (0.068) (0.068) (0.002)
Fair / Poor Health 0.324** 0.230** 0.398** 0.151** 0.020 0.260** 0.329** 0.379** 0.084+ 0.015**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.028) (0.070) (0.048) (0.002)
Missing Health / SCQ 0.137** 0.056+ 0.216** 0.094** 0.011+ 0.143** 0.147** 0.181* 0.020 0.010**
(0.052) (0.029) (0.038) (0.025) (0.006) (0.020) (0.027) (0.090) (0.100) (0.002)
Percent Not Employed 0.448 0.180 0.518 0.772 0.918 0.554 0.225 0.443 0.690 0.939
Pseudo R-squared 0.534 0.364 0.294 0.338 0.392 0.465 0.253 0.225 0.181 0.336
Observations 13,399 7,303 1,737 1,396 2,963 14,009 5,470 2,182 1,657 4,700
Appendix Table 2: Probit Model of Likelihood of Not Being Employed by Age-Group (Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses that allow for clustering for individuals across time. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. All regressions include year, region and 

























English Bckgrnd Immigrant -0.047** -0.022** 0.013 -0.048 -0.028 -0.028 0.150** 0.114** 0.183** 0.032* 0.004 0.003
(0.013) (0.007) (0.018) (0.032) (0.031) (0.060) (0.049) (0.031) (0.025) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011)
Other Immigrants 0.055** 0.004 0.026 0.083+ 0.067 0.067 0.155** 0.042 0.090* 0.032+ 0.006 0.006
(0.021) (0.010) (0.018) (0.049) (0.043) (0.045) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010)
Log Emigration Rate -0.029* 0.000 -0.108+ 0.001
(0.012) (0.043) (0.056) (0.009)
Percent Declared Retired
Pseudo R-squared 0.025 0.401 0.403 0.015 0.269 0.269 0.038 0.322 0.327 0.032 0.349 0.349
Observations 7,303 7,303 7,303 1,737 1,737 1,737 1,396 1,396 1,396 2,963 2,963 2,963
English Bckgrnd Immigrant -0.007 0.012 0.028 0.007 0.028 0.028 0.099** 0.132** 0.251** 0.023* 0.013** 0.013*
(0.017) (0.013) (0.028) (0.058) (0.033) (0.079) (0.025) (0.015) (0.042) (0.012) (0.002) (0.005)
Other Immigrants 0.047* 0.005 0.012 0.098+ 0.069 0.069 0.222** 0.210** 0.259** 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.022) (0.011) (0.016) (0.052) (0.052) (0.071) (0.040) (0.039) (0.034) (0.016) (0.006) (0.007)
Log Emigration Rate -0.010 0.000 -0.125* 0.000
(0.014) (0.062) (0.054) (0.006)
Percent Declared Retired
Pseudo R-squared 0.015 0.293 0.293 0.015 0.231 0.231 0.038 0.174 0.178 0.020 0.310 0.310
Observations 5,470 5,470 5,470 2,182 2,182 2,182 1,657 1,657 1,657 4,700 4,700 4,700
Women
Age 65-69
0.107 0.365 0.640 0.927
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses that allow for clustering for at the disaggregate country level which includes accounting for clustering of individuals across
time. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. All regressions include year, region and remoteness dummies. The second and third specifications also include controls for individual
and househoold characteristics as shown in Table 2.
0.109 0.457 0.750 0.907
Age > 69
Age 45-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age > 64
Appendix Table 3: Probit Model of Likelihood of Being Retired by Gender and Age-Group
(Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
Men
Age 45-59 Age 60-64Overall Age < 60 Age 60-64 Age 65-69 Age > 69 Overall Age < 55 Age 55-59 Age 60-64 Age > 64
Log Emigration Rate -0.094** -0.029** -0.033 -0.158** -0.003 -0.005 0.004 0.012 -0.018 -0.002
(0.032) (0.011) (0.051) (0.051) (0.011) (0.045) (0.014) (0.082) (0.042) (0.006)
Pseudo R-squared 0.578 0.405 0.278 0.338 0.344 0.549 0.302 0.221 0.175 0.308
Observations 12,720 6,938 1,657 1,331 2,794 13,453 5,226 2,101 1,602 4,496
Log Emigration Rate -0.106** -0.041** -0.086* -0.077 -0.003 -0.010 0.005 0.006 -0.069+ -0.001
(0.023) (0.013) (0.041) (0.064) (0.012) (0.038) (0.010) (0.068) (0.037) (0.007)
Not Citizen * CoB No Dual 0.295* 0.233 0.211 0.079 All 0.195 0.025 0.077 0.195** All
(0.122) (0.143) (0.148) (0.067) Retired (0.129) (0.090) (0.095) (0.064) Retired
Citizen * CoB No Dual Allowed 0.047 0.015 -0.033 0.117** 0.012 0.065 -0.008 0.025 All 0.005
(0.049) (0.024) (0.086) (0.025) (0.014) (0.057) (0.018) (0.072) Retired (0.015)
Not Citizen * CoB Allows Dual 0.119** 0.067 0.057 0.161** -0.012 0.107+ 0.003 0.024 0.191** 0.015**
(0.031) (0.046) (0.065) (0.021) (0.020) (0.060) (0.026) (0.082) (0.047) (0.005)
Citizen * CoB Allows Dual 0.103** 0.028 0.139* 0.126* 0.010 0.099* -0.003 0.031 0.234** 0.013*
(0.027) (0.022) (0.055) (0.050) (0.011) (0.040) (0.013) (0.085) (0.036) (0.006)
Pseudo R-squared 0.579 0.408 0.281 0.331 0.345 0.549 0.302 0.221 0.166 0.309
Observations 12,720 6,938 1,657 1,331 2,780 13,453 5,226 2,101 1,561 4,510
Women Men
Appendix Table 4: Probit Model of Likelihood of Being Retired by Age-Group - The Importance of Citizenship
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses that allow for clustering for at the disaggregate country level which includes accounting for clustering of individuals across 
time. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. All regressions include controls for individual and househoold characteristics as shown in Table 2 and year, region and remoteness 
dummies..
(Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
Main Specification - Sample Resticted to Individuals with Citizenship Variables
Main Specification - Citizenship Variables Replace Immigrant Status Variables